Multilevel governance in trouble : the implementation of asylum seekers&#8217; reception in Italy as a battleground by F. Campomori & M. Ambrosini
ORIGINAL ARTICLE Open Access
Multilevel governance in trouble: the
implementation of asylum seekers’
reception in Italy as a battleground
Francesca Campomori1* and Maurizio Ambrosini2
* Correspondence: francesca.
campomori@unive.it
This article belongs to a special
issue (contact person Caroline
Oliver Caroline.Oliver@roehampton.
ac.uk)
1University of Venice, Malcanton
Marcorà Dorsoduro 3484/A 30123,
Venezia, Italy
Full list of author information is
available at the end of the article
Abstract
The reception of asylum seekers in Italy has become an increasingly contentious
issue: many actors, public and private, are involved at various levels of government,
and cooperative behaviour cannot be taken for granted. The multi-level governance
approach sheds light on the possible patterns in vertical relations, while it does not
effectively explore the horizontal relations, which are however crucial, especially at
the local level. Moreover, we argue that the definition of multilevel governance as
negotiated order among public and non-public actors is too rigid and normative.
Local policies of reception are instead a playing field where different actors come
together with different interests, values and frames. This paper discusses the
implementation of asylum seekers’ reception in Italy, looking at both the multilevel
and the horizontal dynamics, and it uses the concept of ‘battleground’ in order
better to grasp the complexities of the interaction between actors. The article
discloses conflicting and competing frames between different tiers of governance,
since municipalities try to resist government imposition related to asylum seekers’
reception in their areas. As for the horizontal dynamics, this paper argues that four
possible patterns emerge in the relation between state and state actors: a) closure vs.
civil society activism; b) tolerance; c) institutional activism vs. anti-immigrant
mobilizations; d) cooperation. Overall, the paper aims at addressing the limits of the
MLG approach by means of a conceptual tool (the “battleground”) which yields a
more vivid understanding of implementation dynamics.
Keywords: Multilevel-governance, Battleground, Asylum seekers and refugees
Introduction
At the end of the 1990s the interplay and intertwining between different levels of
political regulation of migration started to be increasingly studied in order to provide
better understanding of the migration policy process. At the same time, the shifting of
responsibility to non-state actors also became an issue. Two main approaches emerged
in this field of studies, i.e. the venue-shopping and the multilevel governance ap-
proaches. The former (Guiraudon 2000; Guiraudon and Lahav 2000; Lahav and Guir-
audon 2006) deals exclusively with immigration control and argues that nation-states’
responses consist of devolution of decision making upward to intergovernmental fora,
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downward to local authorities, and outward to non-state actors, such as private com-
panies, employers and private security agencies (Guiraudon and Lahav 2000, 164). This
framework has been used to claim the move of domestic policy-makers to EU policy
venues (particularly in order to avoid judicial constraints and the opposition of other
political actors or pro-immigrant groups) and the co-opting of private actors in the per-
formance of the migration control ‘function’ (Lahav and Guiraudon 2006, 212).
The multilevel governance [MLG] approach instead looks mainly at integration
policies (Hepburn and Zapata-Barrero 2014; Scholten and Pennix 2016; Scholten et al.
2018; Spencer 2018) and it gained momentum among migration scholars soon after the
“local turn” in the research on immigrant integration policies (Caponio and Borkert
2010). Born as an alternative approach to intergovernmentalism and functionalist the-
ories of EU integration (Schmitter 2004), MLG turned to a wider conceptual space
claiming an enhanced understanding of the policymaking process. In the current sce-
nario the centralised nature of the nation state has been challenged by almost simultan-
eous processes of supranationalisation and devolution to sub-state units (vertical
dimension) and by the growing importance of non-governmental actors (horizontal
dimension). The intersection between vertical and horizontal dimensions should be the
distinctive feature of this approach (Bache and Flinders, 2004), which entails an explor-
ation of both vertical and horizontal dynamics of migration policymaking in multilevel
settings. To date, however, most studies have explored mainly the vertical or multilevel
aspect of MLG, i.e. the involvement of different levels of government and their relations
(for a review see Caponio and Jones-Correa 2017), while the horizontal dimension, as
well as the relations between vertical and horizontal space, are much less developed.
MLG perspective displays more analytical power in grasping the intergovernmental di-
mension than the horizontal public/private governance. We argue that one of the main
reasons for this lies in the definition itself of multilevel governance as a structure of re-
lations which involves some forms of coordinated actions and where the frames of mi-
grant integration are similar or at least congruent between levels (Scholten 2013). As
we will explain extensively in the next sections in relation to the Italian case, this defin-
ition hardly fits with horizontal dynamics at the local level, as the interplay between
state and non-state actors is often far from resembling a coordinated action within a
similar frame. Put otherwise, MLG emphasises cooperation and coordination among
actors, but the actual governance of immigration is also the product of conflicting pro-
cesses, e.g. fights, protests, difficult interactions (Dabrowski et al. 2014). Various actors,
such as pro and anti-immigrant organizations/groups and the immigrant organization
themselves, play an active role in these processes: this interplay is crucial in order to
understand the outcome of the policy process. Actors and networks should be system-
atically integrated into the MLG approach (Taylor et al. 2013). This gap has been par-
tially coped by the literature on (new) urban governance (da Cruz et al. 2019, for a
review), which nevertheless does not systematically consider the multilevel interaction.
Another shortcoming of the MLG approach is that it has been usually applied to regu-
lar migration and only rarely to asylum-seeker reception (recent exceptions are Spencer
2018 and Panizzon and Van Riemsdijk 2018).
This article discusses the implementation of asylum seekers’ reception in Italy after
the so-called “refugee crisis”. Drawing on the conceptual tools of MLG in analysing the
policy process, we attempt to address its gaps and discuss a possible way out. Our
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research question is: how and to what extent MLG perspective is useful in explaining
implementation dynamics in refugee policies? In relation to this question the article
aims at achieving two main goals: (i) explaining that a twofold analysis -where both the
multilevel and the horizontal governance dynamics are investigated - yields a more
comprehensive understanding of the complexity of asylum-seeker reception; (ii) offer-
ing a complementary perspective for analysing the horizontal interactions. As regards
the second goal, the article takes advantage of the concept of “battleground” introduced
by Ambrosini (2018): it helps to deepen the multi-actor, conflictual and plural local
dynamics, since these dynamics do not necessarily stem from a negotiated order among
interdependent actors (Alcantara and Nelles 2014). Asylum-seeker policy can be framed
as a battleground upon which different actors engage with their own interests, values
and frames. We believe that this concept displays a significant analytical potential be-
cause it effectively discloses how the migration process is managed not only by national
and local political authorities and legislations, and not only by NGOs working in collab-
oration with state actors: it is also an outcome of the interplay among other actors,
such as migrants themselves, pro-immigrant actors and social movements (e.g. No Bor-
ders) and xenophobic movements (Fontanari and Ambrosini 2018; Castelli Gattinara
2017; Pettrachin 2020; see also Lahav and Guiraudon 2006 and their concept of Multi-
Level Playing Field).
The paper proceeds as follows. In the next section we provide an overview of the
impact of the “refugee crisis” in Italy. Section 3 analyses the (difficult) relations between
national and local level, i.e. the vertical patterns in Italian reception policies. We build
on Scholten’s typology (2013) concerning the possible patterns that occur in the inter-
play among the tiers, illustrating its limitations in explaining asylum-seekers reception
in Italy. In section 4 we move to the horizontal dimension and analyse the governance
patterns at the local level. To this end, we first map the main categories of actors who
confront each other on the battleground, disclosing their different frames and values as
well as their specific actions. Then, we analyse the dynamics of the battleground,
highlighting both the exclusionary policies and the innovative and inclusive practices,
often implemented by voluntary or third-sector organizations. Finally, we present a typ-
ology which illustrates the different configurations of state and non-state actors’ rela-
tions. The conclusions summarise the main findings and suggest directions for future
research.
The “refugee crisis” in Italy: an appraisal
Until recent years the whole issue regarding forced migration was almost entirely
ignored by public policies 1 because Italy did not perceive itself as an asylum-seeker
hosting country; indeed, until 2011 asylum applicants were relatively few in number if
compared with those in north-western European countries. Italy has long kept itself on
the margins of asylum seekers’ routes: for years, the Italian authorities unofficially
allowed them to pass through the country, silently supporting their journey to other
countries where they had relatives and friends and where national policies were more
receptive (Ambrosini 2018, 81) 2. It is thus not surprising that in Italy an organic law
1In 2002 Italian Government formally established a national system for refugees’ reception (System for
Protection of Asylum Seekers and refugees [SPRAR]), but until 2014 it was largely unfunded.
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on the reception of refugees does not exist, although since 1990 Italian Parliament ap-
proved many laws on this topic as part of the process of harmonization of EU coun-
tries' legislation on asylum.
The so-called ‘North Africa Emergency’ (Emergenza Nord Africa) in 2011, when more
than 62,000 boat people from African countries arrived in Italy by sea, dramatically re-
vealed the inconsistency of the Italian reception system: an emergency approach pre-
dominated (Civil Protection/Protezione Civile managed the “emergency”) 3, while a
more comprehensive vision of what was happening did not seem to emerge.
The 170,000 asylum-seekers who disembarked on Italian shores in 2014 led to an
Agreement between State, Regions and Local Authorities (Accordo conferenza Unifi-
cata, 10 July 2014) 4 and to the approval of a law (Legislative decree no.142/2015) 5
which tried (not always successfully) to supersede the emergency logic hitherto domin-
ant. The two main issues were: (i) achieving, through a quota system, a homogeneous
distribution of asylum-seekers in all the country’s regions (until 2014 there were huge
imbalances and 70% of asylum-seekers were hosted in three southern regions, i.e. Sicily,
Apulia and Calabria); and (ii) achieving effective institutional cooperation among differ-
ent levels of government (to this end ad hoc bargaining tables were foreseen). The sec-
ond point includes the design of a reception system where the national level assumes
the role of coordinator. This system consists of three phases: rescue and first aid, in-
cluding identification of migrants; first level of reception in centres led by the Ministry
of Interior (CARA, Reception Centre for Asylum Seekers or CDA, Reception Centre);
second level of reception in SPRAR (Protection System for Asylum Seekers and Refu-
gees), which includes language course, psychological and legal support, traineeship and
an individualised project of integration. According to the law no.142/2015 SPRAR was
intended to become the mainstream for all asylum-seekers. Local authorities play a cru-
cial role in the institution of a SPRAR project because they are requested on a volun-
tary basis to launch the reception project in collaboration with NGOs and associations.
The Home Affairs Ministry encouraged the implementation of SPRAR, described “as a
structured form to achieve a widespread reception, overcoming extraordinary solutions,
and taking into account, at the same time, variegated local situations, avoiding imbal-
ances and non-homogeneous distributions” (Ambrosini 2018, 116-117), but the resist-
ance of local authorities led to a lack of reception facilities, and the government
responded by creating a parallel system based on the Centres of Extraordinary Recep-
tion [CAS]: again an emergency response to a recurrent structural issue. In this case,
the national authorities by-passed local governments, giving to private actors (mainly
NGOs, but not only: also hotel owners and other private employers) the task of estab-
lishing and managing reception facilities of various kinds. Local governments in
2In 2015 the introduction of the Hotspot approach (within the European Agenda on migration) made much
more difficult for Italian Authorities to put a blind eye on transit.
3Following an agreement signed in April 2011 by the Government, the Regional Authorities, the Association
of Italian Municipalities (ANCI) and the Union of Italian Provinces (UPI), the system of the Civil Protection
was charged with the implementation of an extraordinary reception plan with the purpose of distributing
migrants throughout Italy, according to the reception capacity of each region. After two years this plan
ended and the centres were closed.
4http://www.prefettura.it/FILES/AllegatiPag/1247/Accordo%20Conferenza%20Unificata.pdf
5Most Italian legislation on asylum originates from transposition of EU directives. Legislative decree no.142/
2015 is not an exception, since it implements directive 2013/32 and 2013/33.
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principle cannot block the settlement of CAS on their territory, even if in some cases,
through protests or legal cavils, they managed to do it.
The actual implementation of the overall reception system revealed some crucial defi-
cits due to conflicts and lack of cooperation between national and local tiers. The im-
plementation phase also revealed the activism of non-state actors, who are able to
change the expected policy outcomes. Even more important is their role in the assist-
ance of (recognised) refugees who do not receive any support by public policies 6 and
of rejected asylum seekers.
The scenario has been further changed with the approval, on 1 December 2018, of
law no.132/2018 by the populist government led by Northern League and 5 Stars
Movement: this law modified the reception system in a restrictive direction. According
to this law, CASs should deliver to asylum seekers just “bath, bed and bread”, while the
other services are no longer funded. Even before the new rules CASs displayed quality
standards significantly lower than SPRARs, but the law further reduces them: for in-
stance, it foresees a cut in the number of cultural mediators and social workers and it
does not funds anymore Italian courses. In addition to this, SPRAR -which has been
renamed SIPROIMI (Protection system for people holding international protection and
unaccompanied minors)- is no longer accessible for asylum-seekers and migrants enti-
tled with humanitarian protection 7. Finally, it has to be noticed that, after the agree-
ment signed in February 2017 between Libya and Italy, the number of people landed in
Italy has hugely decreased (from 119,247 asylum-seeker in 2017 to 23,400 in 2018 and
11.439 in 2019) 8.
The competing frames in vertical interactions between national and sub-
national levels
As said above, the agreement signed in 2014 within the State-Regions conference, and
the decree no.142/2015, committed national, regional and local level to cooperating on
refugees’ reception.
However, in practice, things went differently, and the level of cooperation has been
low. Although the national SPRAR should have become the mainstream in the recep-
tion system, few asylum seekers and refugees have been hosting in it because only a
tiny minority of local authorities agreed to manage a SPRAR project. In order to con-
vince municipalities to host the SPRAR’s network government gave also an incentive to
them: municipalities who host a SPRAR have been exempted from additional reception
centres (.i.e. CAS).
A SPRAR project in fact starts only if a municipality applies to Government’s call: the
participation is voluntary. In January 2019, around 1,800 out of almost 8,000
6Also refugees who have obtained legal entitlement to international protection, in fact, often do not receive
any assistance: a few days after their recognition as refugees, they have to leave the reception facilities in
which they were hosted and in most cases they find themselves on the streets.
7The law no.132/2018 abolishes the permit for humanitarian reasons, introduced in the Italian legal system in
1998, and it only partially substitutes it with different typologies of permits (special protection/protezione
speciale and special cases/casi speciali).
8The high number of arrivals as asylum seekers during the refugee crisis is also due to the closure of nearly
all legal entry channels in Italy for economic migrants along with the 2008 economic crisis and the
consequent severe reduction of numbers of the new working immigrants allowed to access the country
through the annual decrees on flows/decreti flussi: about 31,000, most of them seasonal workers. Therefore,
for many people “asylum seeking” channel is the only possible strategy. However, a sharp distinction between
asylum seekers and economic migrants has been questioning (Crawley and Skleparis 2018).
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municipalities hosted a SPRAR project (35,650 migrants were hosted in SPRARs out of
approximately 150,000 migrants hosted in the institutional reception structures).
Therefore, the majority of migrants (approximately 80%) are assisted through the CAS
(Centres of Extraordinary Reception) system, which gives no clear role or correspond-
ing responsibility to municipalities (Marchetti 2014). As mentioned in the previous sec-
tion, CAS centres are instituted and controlled directly by the government (embodied
by the Prefect), which at any time can decide to open a new centre in an area: the
agreement of the corresponding municipality is not required.
Municipalities in Southern regions (especially Sicily, Apulia, Calabria and Campania)
have been among the most willing in joining the SPRAR’s network (see Table 1). In
many cases policymakers acknowledged in these projects an opportunity for local econ-
omy, particularly in small municipalities in remote areas where the risk of depopulation
is high. Another recognizable pattern in hosting SPRARs project concerns political sub-
cultures: municipalities located in the traditional “red” regions (i.e. Emilia-Romagna
and Tuscany) host much more SPRARs than municipalities in Northern regions with a
traditional “white” sub-culture (that now has been translated in right-wing and anti-
immigrant parties) like Veneto.
To be highlighted is that SPRAR’s projects more explicitly than CASs are designed to
promote refugee integration and, possibly, autonomy: to this end, each person enjoys a
personal project where the beneficiary’s specific experiences and abilities should be
carefully taken into account by a multidisciplinary team. In other words, the SPRAR
system explicitly aims at going beyond mere assistance, i.e. the furnishing of “bath, bed
and bread”.
Table 1 Migrants hosted in SPRARs in each Italian region, updated on 19 January 2019
REGION Hosted migrants
ABRUZZO 746
BASILICATA 660
CALABRIA 3,537
CAMPANIA 2,883
EMILIA ROMAGNA 3,038
FRIULI VENEZIA GIULIA 429
LAZIO 4,467
LIGURIA 1,021
LOMBARDIA 2,422
MARCHE 1,325
MOLISE 1,028
PIEMONTE 1,986
PUGLIA 3,445
TOSCANA 1,837
TRENTINO ALTO ADIGE 392
UMBRIA 469
VALLE D’AOSTA 25
VENETO 784
TOTAL 35,650
Source: SPRAR, System for Protection of Asylum Seekers and Refugees (https://www.sprar.it/i-numeri-dello-sprar)
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Indeed, many local governments, after having declined the invitation to manage a
SPRAR project, have protested against the settlement of refugees in their areas through
CAS centres 9. An exclusionary frame has emerged at the local level, since mayors and
municipalities have resisted the imposition of refugees by national powers upon local
communities (Marchetti and Mannocchi 2016).
Considering this process through the lens of policy analysis evidences that after a
long time of non-decisions, a focusing event (i.e. the so-called ‘refugee crisis’) moved
the government out of its emergency routines in coping with asylum seekers’ reception
and added a new item to the agenda for action (Peters 2015). According to Kingdon’s
seminal work on agendas (1985), focusing events provide opportunities to policy action.
To put it another way, focusing events (sometimes) manage to move an issue on to an
active policy agenda. The Agreement signed in 2014 within the State/regions confer-
ence and legislative decree no.142/2015 were some of the products of this focusing
event. They actually gave a boost to policymakers to reframe the refugee issue at the
national level: from an emergency to be coped with using ad hoc interventions to a
phenomenon that needs to be managed using a longer-term perspective. In 2014, for
instance, the government decided to increase significantly the funding to launch SPRAR
projects (although the number of places in SPRAR was still largely insufficient).
If we make a screenshot of the immediate output of this focusing event, the relation-
ship between tiers could be defined as somewhat in-between Scholten’s pattern (2013)
of “centralist” and “multilevel governance/cooperative”: the agreement signed in 2014
and the decree approved in 2015 mark a stronger role of the national level in taking
the initiative and designing rules and procedures to be followed for policy implementa-
tion. In this regard, it reminds to a top-down (centralist) relationship between the levels
of governments. At the same time, a shared framing of the problem and response could
be envisaged since local authorities, Regions and Government signed an agreement: it
seemed likely that they could achieve coordination and cooperative working relation-
ships. A departure from a “pure” centralist pattern towards a more multi-level govern-
ance one can be also observed if we consider that the participation of Local Authorities
in SPRAR projects is not mandatory, leaving them the choice to commit or otherwise
to this form of reception.
The implementation phase, nevertheless, strongly changes the scenario in the vertical
multilevel patterns: conflicting frames emerge between tiers and, consequently, the
cooperation is far from being obvious. This pattern represents a new wave of local pol-
icies of exclusion (Ambrosini 2018), which displays some differences in comparison
with the past. In particular, it involves many regions and municipalities, and not only
northern regions of Italy, where the anti-immigrant party Northern League has its
strongholds. More than in the past, also municipalities ruled by centre-left coalitions
are involved. From a theoretical point of view, this dynamic significantly differs from
Scholten’s decoupling pattern, which is characterized by the absence of any meaningful
policy interaction and/or coordination between levels and that actually took place also
9Even if CASs host 80% of asylum-seekers, just 3 out 5 municipalities host refugees (https://www.lastampa.
it/2018/02/08/italia/pi-strutture-per-i-profughi-in-un-anno-comuni-aprono-allaccoglienza-2j7bM70T6S2
zxdq8s95PHN/pagina.html): it happened in fact that CASs are often hosted in hotels, barracks or anyway big
buildings where often lot of people (in some cases more than thousand) are hosted together, in some cases
far from the town centre.
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in Italy as for (regular) migrant integration. The point here is much more related to
conflicting and competing frames between different tiers due to political and institu-
tional factors (see Spencer 2018) than to an absence of coordination. Indeed, the local
level (in some cases even the regional level, e.g. Lombardy) 10 openly defies the national
governments: it is not the case that the State designs a policy and sub-state units do
something different (as in decoupling patterns); rather, sub-state units (in particular
local authorities) resist the State. Such resistance took two major directions: on the one
hand, the majority of municipalities did not candidate for managing a SPRAR project
on their territory; on the other hand, many municipalities protested against the estab-
lishment of a CAS on their territories. This second direction in some cases was success-
ful, inhibiting the opening of CAS centres, in many other cases -even when not
successful- achieved however a result: to highlight that local authorities were not re-
sponsible for the settlement of asylum seekers on the territory and were not available
to cooperate in their social integration.
Horizontal dynamics between state and non-state actors at the local level:
exclusionary policies vs. practices of solidarity
Mapping the players
In this section, we move on the local level, where another significant piece of the fight-
ing takes place. As we mentioned in the Introduction, the migration policy process is
also the outcome of a game where many players other than public powers are involved.
Non-state actors can be divided into two main heterogeneous groups: on the one hand,
pro-migrant actors who challenge policies of exclusion; on the other hand, anti-
immigrant actors who try to hamper asylum-seekers’ reception.
As regards the former, four main categories can be distinguished (see Table 2, which
draws on Fontanari and Ambrosini 2018; see also Garkisch et al. 2017 for a compre-
hensive review of Third Sector Organizations and migration). First, NGOs, or Third
Sector Organizations (TSOs), which provide services to migrants and asylum seekers
mainly in professional ways, and often in agreement with public bodies. This is the case
of SPRARs and CASs, which are normally managed by NGOs receiving government
funds. However, in other cases, as in the recent dispute on NGOs saving lives in the
Mediterranean Sea (Irrera 2016), they can act with some independence from public
policies, and even against the will of governments.
Second, other organised actors, including trade unions, churches and associations, which
often combine practical support with political and cultural pressure. They employ profes-
sionals but also volunteers, can cooperate with public powers but also act beyond the laws, for
instance providing help to people with a dubious or irregular legal status (Ambrosini and Van
der Leun 2015; for a comparison with the USA: Hagan 2008)
Third, social movements, which place the defence of immigrant rights alongside
other battles against the state and the capitalist system, but now increasingly provide
also concrete services to migrants and asylum seekers: what Zamponi (2017) calls “dir-
ect social action”.
10http://www.repubblica.it/politica/2015/06/09/news/migranti_maroni_a_prefetti_stop_assegnazioni_-11643
9225/
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Fourth, support groups that spontaneously coalesce, especially around refugees set-
tled in particular localities (Ellermann 2006; Fontanari 2017), for instance providing
help for people in transit at the railway station of Milan (Sinatti 2019), or in the border
zone of Ventimiglia-Val Roja (Giliberti and Queirolo Palmas 2020) ; or organizing sport
and leisure activities at reception centres. In this category we place also individuals who
offer specific assistance with food, money and accommodation (Fontanari and Ambro-
sini 2018), or language lessons, integrating those provided by law in reception centres.
The rationale of this classification lies in the degree of organization: NGOs are the
most formal and organized actors, endowed with a professional staff. The second group
includes various types of organizations, with different level of structuration, which pro-
vide services to asylum seekers and other migrants. The third group, social movements,
by definition does not employ a professional staff: social movement depend on militants
and cannot be confused with NGOs. Finally, spontaneous groups are the most informal
actors.
For what concerns the beneficiaries, our attention focuses on asylum seekers and ref-
ugees. However, for various reasons this group cannot be easily distinguished from mi-
grants without a legal status or in a dubious legal condition: there are for instance
rejected asylum seekers, others who were rejected at the first evaluation, but are appeal-
ing against the decision, people who left reception centres or were expelled from them.
With the exception of NGOs receiving public funds, the other actors normally do not
discriminate between asylum seekers and other migrants.
As regards the forms of activities that such actors develop, there are essentially three
types, the first being navigating the asylum system. At the political level, trade unions,
religious institutions and voluntary associations, simultaneously demand more accept-
ance and support for asylum seekers, as well as more commitment in rescuing them in
Table 2 Typology of supporters for asylum seekers and migrants with irregular status
NGOs and
specialized
organizations
Other CSOs
(associations of
volunteers, churches,
trade unions…)
Social movements Common Citizens
Main
activities
SAR in the sea,
reception on land
Language schools;
Medical services;
Legal advocacy;
Bureaucratic
assistance;
Provision of basic
assistance: bath, bed
and bread
Political protest, but
increasingly provision of
services (e.g. accommodation
in squatted buildings)
Donation of
food, clothes,
money;
accommodation;
Volunteering;
socialization,
leisure
Political
engagement
Variable, recently
higher against
harsher closure of
borders
Variable, but
increasingly coupled
with the provision of
services
Main focus (no
borders movements)
Variable, often
relevant as the
reason to
mobilise
Formalization High (formal
organizations,
contracts with
public authorities)
Mix of formal
structures and
informal activities
Low, but self-organization Low
(spontaneous
mobilization)
Human
resources
Mainly
professionals,
volunteers as
supplementary
resources
Variable, but often
volunteering is
relevant
Militants/volunteers Only volunteers
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the sea. At the personal level, often through lawyers working for free, many of them
help people in presenting their applications for asylum or in appealing against a refusal.
A second type of activity is the provision of services, particularly educational and
social welfare services such as language courses, basic health services, clothing, food,
and shelters for homeless; a condition in which many rejected asylum seekers, but also
recognized refugees, actually fall. These services may be offered by volunteers and are
often funded by private donations along with support from other social institutions.
Overall, these activities provide what Leerkes (2016) calls “secondary poor relief” and
Belloni (2016) describes more positively as “welfare from below”. Another type of ser-
vice is the delivery of moral support furnished by some civil society actors, particularly
faith groups (Bloch et al. 2014: 110; Oliver et al. 2019). Third, there are activities associ-
ated with advocacy: political and cultural opposition to the criminalization of asylum
seekers, protest activities against government policies of exclusion, support for the free
movement of asylum seekers, and the promotion of views alternative to dominant rep-
resentations of the issue (Ambrosini 2018).
The typology set out in Table 2 also describes for each category of supporters the
level of political engagement, the degree of formalization of the various actors and the
kind of human resources committed (if professional or voluntary).
As regards the second group, i.e. the anti-immigrant actors, it is embodied especially
by the far-right protest related to the refugee crisis. Castelli Gattinara (2017) argues
that the refugee crisis increased the amount of anti-immigrant demonstrations and far-
right street politics, although “hardly any research has investigated the predominant
themes and narrative of anti-refugee and asylum campaigns” (p. 76). He also describes
a variety of different forms taken by the anti-refugee mobilization in Italy, ranging from
direct confrontational actions challenging the opening of refugee centers to institu-
tional activities by established representative political organizations. Besides the main-
stream narrative on the “invasion”, other themes have been used in the anti-refugee
discourse, such as the corruption of the political system (particularly targeting left-wing
refugee aid organizations) and the discouragement of ordinary citizens that feel aban-
doned (p. 91), while the activists have strategically distanced themselves from the trad-
itional far right, particularly as regards the language of racial superiority.
Even more important is the fact that many elected local authorities, not only those
belonging to the anti-immigrant (Northern) League or the political right, have openly
opposed the establishment of reception centers in their areas. Sometimes they have
joined the far-right demonstrations; more often, they have autonomously enacted vari-
ous forms of opposition, through declarations, administrative procedures, but also mo-
bilizations of citizens and even road blocks. Various arguments have been used to
justify such positions. Among the most recurrent is a frame of contrast between over-
bearing central powers and peaceful local communities, which are obliged to host
unknown and dangerous aliens. Connected to this is the victim complex: local commu-
nities are the “victims” of an “invasion”. This frame permits the political construction
of an opposition between “us”, the peaceful and integrated local community, and
“them”, the aliens, who are the bearers of danger, insecurity and the depletion of wel-
fare resources. Furthermore, this view promotes the idea that “we” are under attack
and have the right to defend ourselves, our families, our homes and our properties. In
this framework, the local territory is conceived as a private property, or an extension of
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home. A famous slogan of the (Northern) League against immigrants declares “Masters
in our own home” (Ambrosini 2018).
Following Faist (2002), this could be seen as an example of “symbolic politics” or
“meta-politics”, in which “real world issues” are connected with “fears around inter-
national migration” (Faist 2002, pp. 11-12). More specifically, “through meta-politics,
low-level threats usually gain out-of-proportion significance”. An important aspect is
that by establishing a firm dichotomy between “us” and “them”, local authorities and
their supporters in some way recreate a meaning of community, reinforcing the bonds
among local residents who feel that they share a common threat.
Innovative approaches to bridging the gap of integration policies: strengths and
weaknesses
A crucial aspect of refugee policy in Italy is the lack of vision (and actions) as regards
refugee integration once the timing for the institutional aid ends 11 . The issue of inte-
gration has been a weakness even for regular migration since the 1990s: the absence of
a clear national direction and the high degree of devolution of competence on immi-
grant integration - and social policy more generally - to regional and local authorities
have contributed to creating a context of limited and fragmented social protection
(Campomori and Caponio 2013).
In order to cope with the deficiencies of public policies in this specific phase of tran-
sition from reception to integration, a number of actors - religious institutions, volun-
tary associations and also some municipalities hosting a SPRAR project – have
launched innovative initiatives. Among them, the schemes for domestic hospitality of
refugees in Italian families and the project of humanitarian corridors are particularly in-
teresting and innovative. As regards domestic hospitality, it was experienced for the
first time in 2008 in Turin within the SPRAR project and since 2015 it has been imple-
mented in other cities, especially in the North and Center of Italy (for a detailed and
up-to-date overview of these initiatives see Campomori and Feraco 2018; Marchetti
2018). These schemes display differences in their actual implementation, as regards the
economic contribution which the families receive or the length of the project, but a
common denominator is apparent: on the one hand, the belief that a (temporary) stay
of refugees in a family –including the possibility of sharing the family’s relational
resources - could enable the building of networks useful for both labor market and so-
cial integration; on the other hand, these projects gamble on the idea that the example
given by the hosting families could contribute to reducing people’s prejudices and fear
related to immigration and refugees and in generating trust. While positive feedbacks
have emerged in relation to the integration objectives (Marchetti 2018) the number of
refugees hosted in these projects is still low (Caritas Italiana has the primacy with 118
refugees hosted in various Italian cities). The political climate in Italy and the new
11A National Plan for the integration of people receiving international protection (Piano nazionale di
integrazione dei titolari di protezione internazionale) was published on 26 September 2017 by the Ministry of
the Interior, but it was still not comprehensive and it did not include migrants entitled to the former (before
the law 132/2018) humanitarian protection (25% of the overall number of asylum-seekers and 60% of mi-
grants who receive a positive decision about their application).
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official discourse by national authorities in the period 2018-2019 hindered the diffusion
of such project. On the other side, however (on 2 March 2019) a big demonstration in
Milan, with probably more than 200,000 people in the streets, showed that a vocal mi-
nority had started to protest in favor of human rights and against the policies of closure
enacted by the (Northern) League and 5Star Movement government (May 2018-August
2019).
Another weakness is the relation between public and private actors: in the case of
Caritas Italiana (and partly of an association called Refugees Welcome) no official rela-
tions are envisaged, while in others the project is officially part of a SPRAR or CAS 12 ,
and third-sector associations manage the project on behalf of the municipality (in the
case of SPRAR) or government (in the case of CAS). The schemes of domestic hospital-
ity included in SPRAR or CAS do not have a national framework and regulation, but
are local and therefore dependent on the voluntarism of single municipalities or prefec-
tures, in addition to the commitment of non-public actors.
The second relevant practice - humanitarian corridors - aims at innovating both
asylum policies and asylum seekers integration. Human corridors organize the
arrival of people in need of humanitarian protection from the regions of immediate
reception at the borders of war zones. They have similarities with resettlement pol-
icies supported by private sponsors in other countries (e.g., Canada) (Kumin 2015).
Asylum seekers receive a permit and they can reach a safe country through regular
flights, without dangerous journeys and profits for human smugglers. In Italy
humanitarian corridors started at the end of 2015 after the signing of an agree-
ment among the catholic S. Egidio community, the evangelical churches federation,
the Waldensian Board and the Italian government. Around 1000 persons arrived
safely in Italy through these corridors from Lebanon. In 2017 another corridor
opened from Ethiopia, promoted by the Catholic Church (Caritas, Fondazione
Migrantes and S.Egidio community), and 300 persons legally entered Italy. Other
people arrived in 2018 from Lebanon and Ethiopia, summing up to almost 2,500
refugees received through the humanitarian corridors. After their arrival asylum
seekers are hosted in parishes, religious institutes or apartments in various towns
and regions, according to the idea of a “scattered reception”. They follow a 12-
month integration process entirely funded by the private actors who promoted the
project also with the support of volunteers. In the corridor from Ethiopia, every
asylum seeker or family is accompanied by a “tutor-family” in acquiring knowledge
of the local society, accessing services, attending Italian language courses, building
social networks, looking for employment. This is a clear example of the activism of
civil society in accordance with the State, and in particular of interreligious cooper-
ation in this field (for other examples in Europe: Lyck-Bowen and Owen 2019).
France, Belgium and Andorra followed the example and signed similar agreements
with religious actors, showing the potential of the project of becoming a “good
practice” internationally recognized.
Notwithstanding the strong innovative potential for asylum policies, also for humani-
tarian corridors some critical issues emerge, such as the actual time required for
12In the case of CAS the beneficiaries are not people with a recognized entitlement to international
protection, but asylum seekers.
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integration (12 months may not be enough for every person) 13 and the difficult bal-
ance between the need to support these persons and the need to foster their autonomy.
Moreover, the selection of beneficiaries is a process that raises many dilemmas related,
for instance, to the categories of people who should be given priority: the most vulner-
able or persons with a better integration potential in the labor market.
The interplay between public powers and civil society: a typology
Local policies of exclusion, observed for either regular and irregular immigration
(Ambrosini 2013), have been activated also in refugee reception. As we have already
observed, in the first reception phase these policies translate into the attempt of many
municipalities (and anti-immigrant activists) to avoid the settlement of refugees in their
areas, loudly protesting against their arrival. In a second phase, when asylum seekers
and refugees have actually settled, exclusionary policies manifested anytime local
authorities denied refugees the residence card (certificato di residenza) or anytime mu-
nicipalities hamper the possibility of receiving it, although in Italy migrants who obtain
international or humanitarian protection are entitled to welfare provisions on the same
conditions as Italian citizens (art.27 Legislative decree n.251/07) (Bolzoni et al. 2016;
Gargiulo 2017).
Third-sector organizations, NGOs and religious institutions have counteracted these
anti-immigrant practices either by providing basic services or fostering refugees’ capaci-
ties, or giving them voice through public advocacy (Garkisch et al. 2017), or launching
innovative practices for enhancing integration such as domestic hospitality.
In fact, the interplay between public powers and civil society organizations is not
clear-cut, and it can assume different forms depending on the values and mission of
the various civil society organizations and on the actions implemented by local author-
ities addressing asylum seekers’ reception. To date, scholarly debate has not shed
enough light on the relationship between state and non-state actors at the local level.
In an attempt to bridge this gap we drew on some research studies (Ambrosini and
Van der Leun 2015; Spencer 2018; Garkisch et al. 2017) and on a press review of online
Italian newspapers (local news), identifying four different configurations of state and
non-state actors’ relations (see Table 3): a) closure vs. civil society activism; b) toler-
ance; c) institutional activism vs. anti-immigrant mobilizations; d) cooperation.
When closure prevails, an escalation occurs in the policy of exclusion implemented
by local authorities, which are also hostile to private solidarity and hamper its action.
Closure dynamics have happened for instance in some cities on Italy’s borders, such as
Ventimiglia: in August 2016 the left-wing mayor of that city issued a decree which
made it illegal to give food and drink to asylum-seekers in public areas (8 months later
the mayor canceled the decree) 14. Other examples of closure are the cases of Udine
(Friuli Venezia Giulia) and Saronno (Lombardy). As regards Udine, in June 2016 seven
volunteers of the Ospiti in arrivo association were investigated because they had helped
refugees with food, blankets and information on where they could find shelter in the
city 15. In the case of Saronno, in October 2016 the (Northern) League mayor
13As a matter of fact, the local branches of the humanitarian corridors are actually giving support to refugees
hosted also beyond the 12 months’ deadline.
14https://www.ilfattoquotidiano.it/2017/04/23/ventimiglia-vietato-dare-cibo-e-acqua-ai-migranti-solo-la-
mobilitazione-costringe-il-sindaco-pd-a-revocare-lordinanza/3538898/
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successfully opposed the opening of a reception center which should have been man-
aged by the local Caritas (the center was already fully equipped for reception) 16. Anti-
refugees movements and more or less numerous groups of local residents also sup-
ported closure of reception centers.
The configuration that we call tolerance emerges when the local authority imple-
ments exclusion policies, but at the same time silently accepts provisions delivered by
NGOs. This is also the case of municipalities where the services implemented by public
actors are largely insufficient and local authorities implicitly delegate them to civil soci-
ety. This dynamic has had a long tradition in Italian integration policies since even
before the refugee crisis (Caponio 2006; Campomori 2008). Some examples follow. In
Milan the network Scuole senza permesso 17 (Schools without permit) offers free Italian
lessons to all migrants explicitly claiming that the stay permit is not required. In Rome,
Trento, Palermo and Catania, Centro Astalli (part of the Jesuit Refugee Service in Italy)
offers refugees medicines, professional medical help, meals, clothes: local authorities
generally acknowledge Centro Astalli as a resource for the territory. In Lombardy
(Northern Italy), many clinics managed by NGOs and employing hundreds of medical
doctors as volunteers take care of health issues of irregular immigrants with the silent
tolerance of public authorities (Ambrosini 2015; Piccoli 2016). Finally, Caritas offers
many services including domestic hospitality with the project Protetto, Rifugiato a casa
mia 18. Sometimes, examples of closure dynamics change to tolerance, as happened in
Ventimiglia, where the mayor canceled the decree which made illegal many forms of
practical support.
We call institutional activism vs. anti-immigrant mobilization a dynamic where pub-
lic powers display a quite welcoming approach toward refugees (for instance they open
a SPRAR project in their area) but anti-refugee groups protest and fight. Empirically,
this configuration and the last one (cooperation) tend to overlap, since when a SPRAR
opens it is often the case that some people/organizations praise the initiative and even
collaborate, while others combat it and protest.
Table 3 Typology of the different relations between state and non-State actors at the local level
Closure vs. civil s
ociety activism
Tolerance Institutional activism
vs. anti-refugees
mobilizations
Cooperation
Dynamics Local authorities try
to prevent non-State
actors from helping
refugees
Local authorities do
not hamper non-State
actors’ activism
Groups of residents
loudly protest against
institutional pro-asylum
seekers initiatives
Local authorities and
non-State actors
cooperate in fostering
asylum-seeker reception
Some
empirical
evidence (Italy)
Ventimiglia,
Saronno, Udine
Centro Astalli (Roma,
Palermo, Catania,
Trento); NGOs’
clinics in Lombardy;
network Scuole senza
permesso.
Castrovillari, San Giorgio
Ionico, Brindisi, Gorino
SPRAR system
implementation in
Tuscany and
Emilia-Romagna
15http://www.udinetoday.it/cronaca/archiviata-inchiesta-ospiti-arrivo-udine.html
16https://www.ilfattoquotidiano.it/2016/10/01/migranti-sindaco-leghista-blocca-il-centro-accoglienza-delle-
suore-ma-non-ha-fatto-i-conti-con-il-viminale/3067047
17http://www.scuolesenzapermesso.org/
18http://inmigration.caritas.it/
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An example of this dynamic is the case of Castrovillari 19, a town in Calabria, where
the decision to open a SPRAR for 20 asylum seekers triggered strong protests by right-
wing party activists. Many other examples can be found in other municipalities, such as
San Giorgio Ionico (Taranto) 20 and Brindisi 21, both located in Puglia. In San Giorgio
Ionico citizens presented a petition to stop the implementation of the SPRAR project
decided by the municipality; and in Brindisi residents organized a committee which fi-
nally managed to stop the project of a reception centre in the neighborhood of Santa
Chiara.
Even in the traditionally left-wing and usually pro-immigrant Emilia-Romagna, there
occurred an episode of intolerance which received wide media coverage: in October
2016, a large number of the citizens of the small town of Gorino (Emilia-Romagna)
loudly protested against the arrival of 12 asylum-seekers (women), with some children,
decided by the Prefect. The protest was so vehement that the Prefect finally decided to
change his plans. A common denominator in all these events is that the protesters al-
ways wanted to make clear that they were not racist: the issue in their opinion was that
their municipality was not the right place to host asylum-seekers (but they also added
that “we cannot accommodate the whole of Africa in Italy”).
The last ideal-type exhibits a certain level of cooperation between public and private
actors: they engage in an attempt at dialogue and collaboration (positive governance).
This should be the very philosophy of the SPRAR system, which foresees an active role
of the municipality and local associations. Many municipalities in Tuscany and Emilia-
Romagna are cases in point. Among the best practices are those of Parma and Bologna,
which have also implemented domestic hospitality within SPRAR projects.
Conclusions
This article has argued for the convenience of integrating the venue shopping and the
MLG approaches with a new perspective in order to obtain a comprehensive under-
standing of the policies related to asylum seeker reception, particularly in the phase of
implementation. While the venue shopping framework deals only with migration con-
trol, MLG is not completely satisfactory for the analysis of the relationship between
state and non-state actors. In fact, while the MLG vertical approach has been widely
theorised and reached a quite sophisticated level of operationalization (see Scholten
2013, but also Zapata-Barrero and Barker 2014 for a partially different categorization),
patterns in the interaction between public powers and civil society have not received
the same theoretical attention. This deficiency in the scholarly debate suggests that
MLG is better equipped to analyse the interaction among public powers, i.e. intergov-
ernmental relations (Caponio and Jones-Correa 2017). Moreover, the dynamic and con-
flictual aspects of both vertical and horizontal relations, the role of actors and of their
networks, the capacity to go beyond a simple description of the playfield, require fur-
ther attention (for a review of criticisms to MLG approach: Pettrachin 2020).
19https://lacnews24.it/cronaca/castrovillari-apre-sprar-migranti-protesta-fratelli-italia_28658/
20http://www.norbaonline.it/ondemand-dettaglio.php?i=27086#!/
21https://www.quotidianodipuglia.it/brindisi/si_al_progetto_sprar_ma_nel_quartiere_monta_la_protesta-245
0661.html, https://www.quotidianodipuglia.it/brindisi/brindisi_santa_chiara_no_immigrati_affitto-2458584.
html
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The article has made an exploratory attempt to analyse current asylum seeker and
refugee reception in Italy, paying attention to both vertical and horizontal dynamics. It
discloses that putting too much emphasis on the “negotiated order” among involved ac-
tors neglects an in-depth investigation of conflicts, which however largely contribute to
policy outcomes. As for intergovernmental relations the analysis of Italian case dis-
played fluctuating patterns: from ones in-between centralist and cooperative, as seems
when looking at espoused national policies, to an open conflict which becomes fully
clear in the implementation phase. As a matter of fact, many local authorities resisted
against state decisions and to the Prefects that should make them operative: what hap-
pened therefore was different from an absence of any meaningful policy coordination
between levels, i.e. the decoupling pattern in Scholten’s typology.
As for the horizontal dimension, in reception and integration policies the relationship
between state and non-state actors gains particular importance at the local level: a var-
iety of players and values confront each other on the playing field and it becomes evi-
dent that policy outcomes are also the result of their interactions (or absence of
interactions), which cannot be foreseen in advance. Moreover, we argue that in analys-
ing MLG dynamics it should be necessary to take account not only of the pro-
immigration lobbies, but also of anti-immigration groups, which could influence the
decisions and behaviours of local authorities. The well-known “policy gap hypotheses”
between goals and outcomes (Cornelius et al. 2004; De Haas et al. 2018), applied
mainly in the field of immigration control, could be used also to analyse asylum-seeker
and refugee reception and integration. For this purpose, we believe that it is crucial to
investigate not only the various levels of policymaking, but also the diverse actors and
logics that prevail in it (see Lahav and Guiraudon 2006). In particular, in the analysis of
the horizontal dimension the concept of ‘battleground’ contributes to overcoming the
conceptualization of governance as negotiated order among public and non-public ac-
tors (Alcantara and Nelles 2014): NGOs and civil societies often oppose public actors
(and their policy) in various ways instead of looking for a “negotiated order”, or some
kind of “co-production”, as it is evident on investigating local policies of exclusion or
the dispute on NGOs in the Mediterranean (Ambrosini 2018). The concept of battle-
ground encompasses conflict and cooperation, convergence and divergence, the auton-
omy of civil society facing public policies, while “negotiated order” emphasizes the
agreement or the convergence between the actors involved.
The typology introduced in section 4 reporting different configurations in the relation
between public and private actors highlights the need to consider not only the “official”
governance, but also the overall dynamics among all the actors. The analytical frame-
work included in the concept of ‘battleground’ enables an in-depth analysis of frames
and actions of the various players. It makes clear that the social conditions of asylum
seekers (and migrants in dubious or irregular legal condition) are not the direct output
of official migration policies nor of “official” governance relations between state and
non-state actors: declared public policies do not always coincide with implemented pol-
icies since other actors enter the scene and can partially change the outcome.
Future research should devote more empirical investigation to the actual dynamics of
closure, tolerance, institutional activism and cooperation: e.g., which factors support
the establishment of a type of relation or another one? Which actors are more active in
different contexts and settings of relation? Under which conditions does civil society
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more effectively mobilize, or anti-immigrant movements gain ground? A comparative
perspective would also strengthen and verify the explanatory potential of our concep-
tual proposal.
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